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Since the 1970s, the investment and
activity of new entrant or offshore-
based vehicle assemblers in North
America has rapidly expanded,
comprising 18 plants, plus another
three joint-venture plants with the
traditional domestic Big Three
manufacturers (Figure 1). While the
plants vary in size, total capacity 
now exceeds 4 million vehicles, 
25 percent of the current market.
Traditional business considerations
such as sales volume growth,
incremental worldwide sales capture,
and insulation against currency
fluctuations brought early offshore
assemblers to North America. 
But North American entry timing was
also influenced by political tensions.
A number of trade regimes and
agreements developed as a result of
political trade friction between the
United States and Japan in the 1970s.
For example, in 1980 the Carter
administration rejected any quota
arrangements on Japanese imports,
believing that the negative effects of
such arrangements outweighed their
benefits. However, the administration
secured the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry’s (MITI’s)
endorsement of a “principle” that
Japanese companies with high exports
to the United States should build
factories here. While this agreement
lacked any force in law, it was a
powerful signal to the Japanese
industry. 
A dispute over agricultural tariffs
(“Chicken Tariff”) with the European
Community led to a retaliatory U.S.
tariff of 25 percent applied primarily
on imported light trucks from
Volkswagen. Later, in 1980, courts
ruled that the tariff should also apply
to Japanese vehicle imports, and the
tariff remains in effect to this day.
Soon after, in 1981, the U.S. and
Japanese governments established an
initial three-year Voluntary Restraint
Agreement (VRA)—the most wide-
ranging automotive trade agreement
between Japan and the United States,
and probably the most influential in
the establishment of new entrant
facilities in the United States.
Moreover, its allocation of shares to
assemblers was based on Japanese
companies’ market share in the
United States, and hence differentially
constrained their U.S. sales levels. 
Today, traditional business
considerations drive the building and
expansion of foreign-based companies
in the United States. Assemblers like
Honda and Mercedes have opened
plants to meet demand for minivans
and SUVs, respectively. And generally,
foreign-owned suppliers have 
opened U.S. plants as part of their
globalization strategy or to follow
their customers, much the same
reasons U.S. suppliers themselves 
go abroad.
OSAT, with the support of Capgemini,
developed an interview instrument 
to investigate how new entrants
approached the challenges they 
faced in establishing North American
operations. We identified the major
lessons learned from these challenges
and grouped them into the following
five categories: site selection, general
organizational structure, human
resources, value chain, and
manufacturing. Many of the challenges
the new entrants overcame have
direct implications for the traditional,
long-established suppliers here in
North America, though the parallels
are not always exact. 
This report builds on our prior
research that examined the key
decisions four early Japanese 
new entrant assemblers—Honda,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Toyota—
Introduction: Tracking the Impact of
Globalization on the Automotive Industry
THE CHALLENGES NEW ENTRANTS IN NORTH AMERICA 
HAVE OVERCOME PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO THE TYPES OF
CHALLENGES ALL AUTOMOTIVE COMPANIES WILL CONFRONT 
AS GLOBALIZATION PROCEEDS.
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faced in selecting their U.S. plant
sites, the general organizational
structure of their efforts, their human
resource challenges and practices,
their approach to the production
value chain, and their manufacturing
products and processes.1 This report
supplements those findings with
Honda’s recently established Lincoln,
Alabama, facility; Mercedes’ Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, facility; and supplier
facilities consisting of Brose North
America’s Chicago, Illinois, facility;
and Brose Mexico’s Puebla and
Querétaro, Mexico, facilities; Denso’s
Battle Creek, Michigan, facility;
Valeo’s Greensburg, Indiana, facility;
and Yazaki’s Griffin, Georgia, facility.
We chose Honda’s Alabama plant
because it provides us an example 
of a well-established assembler that
has recently expanded its operations;
Mercedes because the company
provides a perspective on the
European experience; Denso, 
Valeo and Yazaki because each has
worldwide operations and a diverse
North American customer base; and
Brose because its Chicago plant is
currently under development and
because its customer base is primarily
comprised of European assemblers.
We hope our findings help support
the future success of all North
American suppliers and assemblers,
whether the traditional, long-
established companies, or the newer
entrants to the North American
industry that constitute the focus 
of this report. Just as Japanese and
European assemblers and suppliers
experience a great many challenges
starting production in North
America—from selecting an
appropriate construction site to
managing a supply chain—traditional
U.S. assemblers and suppliers also
experience the challenges of
globalization. We believe the
challenges new entrants in North
America face will provide insight 
into the types of challenges all
automotive companies will confront
as globalization proceeds. (For a
detailed look at historical industry
trends in production, sales and profit,
see Appendix.)
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1Alkire, Kara F.; Flynn, Michael S.; Sims, Maitreya Kathleen; Senter Jr., Richard; and Kang, Yookyung. Moving from Market to Production: Lessons from







































Figure 1. Distribution of domestic, overseas, and joint-venture assembly plants in North America. 
(Location of numbers does not necessarily indicate locations of plants within a state.)
When Nissan Motor Co. looked to
North America as a potential location
for new production operations,
Mississippi offered the automaker
$363 million in tax breaks and
incentives to locate in the state,
according to a report by the World
Markets Research Center (WMRC).
It’s not surprising then that the
company chose Mississippi over 
other southern state hopefuls in
which to build one of its new plants.
Nissan is not alone. Incentives such
as these are just one of the factors
driving a number of overseas
assemblers and suppliers to open
operations in the U.S. There’s no
question that these automotive new
entrants are a competitive threat to
traditional domestic firms, but the
new entrants’ experiences offer
lessons both about the changing 
state of the automotive industry and
the competitive requirements for
company success today.
Two broad trends currently 
dominate the automotive industry’s
reorganization: consolidation and
globalization. Despite the ongoing, 
if slow, growth of the industry, the
number of independent assemblers
and suppliers is decreasing. In
addition, assemblers and, to some
extent, suppliers are establishing a
manufacturing presence in nations
beyond their home countries. 
This second trend is clearly evident 
in the United States, where Japanese
entrants and, more recently, European
and Korean entrants have expanded
the U.S. production base and market
choices, making the U.S. market
much more competitive. In fact, 
the traditional domestics have lost 
22 points of market share since 1978,
mostly to Japanese assemblers.
Moreover, the market has improved
its product offerings, as vehicle prices
have been restrained, quality, reliability,
and durability have improved, and
the sheer number of choices in the
different vehicle segments has grown. 
Our research was designed to
examine the impact of these trends
and investigate how new entrants
approached the challenges they 
faced in establishing U.S. operations.
The study uncovered a number of
key findings.
Executive Summary
THE NUMBER OF OVERSEAS ASSEMBLERS AND SUPPLIERS 
IN NORTH AMERICA IS GROWING. THIS RESEARCH REPORT
EXAMINES THE IMPACT OF THIS TREND AND INVESTIGATES
HOW NEW ENTRANTS OVERCAME CHALLENGES
IN ESTABLISHING THEIR U.S. OPERATIONS.
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“The more quickly you 
can localize product, 
the more successful and




If there is one over-riding lesson 
from the collective experience of the
nine new entrants we have examined, 
it is that the opportunity to “start with
a clean sheet,” “establish a greenfield
operation,” “avoid unions,” or even
“receive enormous government
subsidies” does not eliminate all the
challenges in establishing successful
North American automotive
operations. In fact, the problems
facing new entrants may not be any
less serious or that different from
those facing traditional operations,
but how the transplants overcame
problems is different. Indeed,
penalties and handicaps, as well as
opportunities come with newness. 
Site Selection 
Location. Overseas firms are
increasingly choosing locations in the
South or Mid-South, and often favor
small-town or rural settings for their
U.S.-sited plants. In terms of both
assembly and supplier activity, these
locations now constitute a second
automotive concentration, beyond the
Detroit-centered, Midwestern location
of the traditional U.S. industry.
Indeed, the South and Mid-South
regions are rapidly developing both
the advantages and disadvantages of
such concentration.
The new entrant suppliers and
assemblers we interviewed considered
a number of factors before selecting 
a specific plant construction site.
Aside from customer location, the
most frequently mentioned criterion
was location infrastructure, including
the availability of natural resources,
power, and proximity to major
highways and airports.
Incentives. Our respondents voiced
some strong cautions regarding site
selection. Perhaps the most telling is
the caveat that new entrants must
have a business case that is robust
enough to support the factory after
any initial financial incentives and
subsidies end. However large and
enticing the incentives may be, 
they do terminate, and effective site
selection must reflect more long-term
business considerations and plans. 
Supplier Parks. Proximity to
suppliers has its advantages, but
supplier parks adjacent to assembly
activities can also create tensions,
such as wage pressures and worker
recruitment conflicts. Fortunately, the
U.S. transportation infrastructure can
usually support supplier locations
some distance from the often multiple
customers a supplier’s plant must serve.
General Organizational Structure
Balancing Roles. New entrants are
offshore relatives of foreign companies,
but also players in the North American
industry. Some level of plant autonomy
is important so that appropriate plant
adaptations and changes can be
implemented. However, some level 
of integration, coordination, and
communication with the offshore
parent company is equally critical 
for effective operation as part of the
company. Balancing these somewhat
contradictory demands for autonomy
and integration is an important
challenge for new entrants. 
Management Autonomy. We asked 
to what degree the new entrants
experienced management autonomy
relative to their headquarters. The
assemblers we interviewed indicated
that they have had and continue to
have moderate to full autonomy 
in the United States. While most
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suppliers indicated that they earned
autonomy over time, surprisingly, 
one supplier indicated that as 





in the U.S. automotive industry is
progressing more rapidly than in 
the Japanese market, and probably
somewhat more than in the European
industry. To integrate with the U.S.
industry, a new entrant must progress
at a feasible but rapid rate. Yet if a
new entrant’s parent company
integrates IT solutions slowly because
of diluted resources or an inability to
establish an implementation team, the
new entrant risks incompatibility with 
and estrangement from the rest of 
the company, its suppliers, and its
customers.
Human Resources 
Management Mix. The ratio of
expatriate managers (foreign managers
relocated to assist in the development
of, in this case, a North American-
sited plant) to local North American
managers varies. There is a consensus
that managers’ assignments should
drive the mix, with some targeted
increase in the number of local
managers over time. 
Management Assignments. Across 
all the companies we have studied, 
no functional assignment has been
exclusively filled by either expatriate
or local managers at startup or soon
thereafter. However, local managers
may best serve areas such as human
resources, purchasing, and operations,
while expatriate managers are often
needed to share parent company
culture, provide process support, and
inculcate quality approaches. Initial
assignments should reflect the culture
the plant hopes to achieve, and that
can sometimes mean that local
industry experience can be a negative. 
Local Management Retention.
The U.S. labor market is quite open,
and many executives and managers
believe they should follow a
professional career path across
companies, rather than a company
career across professions. This open
labor market has made retention of
successful local managers a major
issue. A new entrant needs to assess
how attractive its employment is and
design flexible career paths, because
that will determine its holding power. 
Workforce Recruitment. The new
entrants tended to rely on a very long
workforce selection process, involving
multiple steps. Part of this was
deliberate: It was designed to test the
applicants’ commitment to working
for the company. The most frequently
mentioned pleasant surprise among
both suppliers and assemblers was
their American labor forces’ work
ethic, enthusiasm, and morale.
Workforce Training. Both suppliers
and assemblers supplemented on-the-
job training with some classroom
education. In total, the recent supplier
new entrants we interviewed trained
their initial workforce between 80
and 160 hours, while assemblers
trained their initial workforce
considerably longer—in some cases, 
up to six months. 
Value Chain 
Supplier Selection. Both new entrant
assemblers and suppliers need to
exercise considerable care in selecting
their suppliers. Blending traditional,
offshore suppliers with new ones can
be a difficult challenge. While new
entrant assemblers said cost was a
selection factor, most were more
concerned with effective processes
than delivery price when selecting a
new supplier, counting on improving
processes to reduce cost. 
With the exception of one supplier,
most of the companies experienced
high supply chain stability at startup.
Some actions that new entrants took
to maintain low supplier turnover
included inventory buffering, providing
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the supplier early engineering support,
and implementing just-in-time and
just-in-sequence production. 
Supplier Relations. When asked
what kind of relationship assemblers
and suppliers expected with their
suppliers and customers, respectively—
a customer-supplier partnership or 
an arm’s-length relationship—all
expected a partnership. Suppliers
agreed, though, that this was a mere
expectation. The actual relationship
varied with the customer. All the
suppliers described their offshore-
based customers as maintaining a
partnership and their traditional
domestic customers as falling short 
of a partnership. 
Supply Chain Management. Supply
chain management (SCM) raises
particular challenges for new, offshore
operations, and new entrants must
address these in order to succeed.
First, high logistics costs come 
with offshore suppliers. As a result,
inventory buffering at startup is almost
always required. Second, only a small
proportion of business should be
given to a new supplier at startup.
Third, modifying specifications for
new suppliers can prove costly. 
In one instance, the problem was
solved only after developing
expensive proprietary tooling. 
New and Inherited Customers. Most
new entrant suppliers must add new
customers to their traditional customer
base to survive in the North American
environment. This may create tension
between a supplier and its legacy
customers. 
Competitive Pressures. Suppliers tell
us the cost-reduction pressures they
experience vary, and that some of
their assembler customers are more
concerned about quality and just-in-
time, especially at startup, than with
generic cost-downs. This is consistent
with differences in supplier relationship
philosophies across the assemblers.
Manufacturing 
New vs. Old. New entrants generally
appear to operate better if they begin
operations by building established,
rather than new products and by
starting out with established, rather
than new manufacturing processes. 
Schedule Stability. Rapidly achieving
schedule stability was not a major
problem for most of the assemblers
and suppliers we interviewed,
especially given that the companies
initially built to inventory. 
Time to Full Operation. New
entrants’ time to full operation,
defined in terms of rated jobs per
hour operating on one shift, was
typically short, representing another
competitive challenge to traditional
domestics.
Information Technology. Some plants
found it quite difficult to implement
and integrate the IT system
simultaneously with manufacturing
startup. Early adoption of the IT
system seems to work better.
While this topline review provides 
a summary of the key findings of 
our research, the pages that follow
offer more in-depth analysis of the
experiences and challenges faced by
overseas assemblers and suppliers as
they established operations in 
North America.
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Industry performance statistics
provide evidence of the success new
entrants have experienced in North
America over the last three decades
(see Appendix). The statistics do not,
however, detail how the new entrants
achieved such success. We believe the
following pages, which describe the
challenges successful new entrants
faced as they entered the North
American market, can provide valuable
insight to any supplier or assembler
opening, expanding, or reorganizing






drove the building and expansion 
of the new entrant plants we studied.
Among other reasons, Honda and
Mercedes opened plants to meet
demand for minivans and SUVs,
respectively. Honda specifically chose
to build in the Southeast because a
large proportion of the company’s
minivans are sold in that region of
the United States. Generally, new
entrant suppliers have opened 
North American plants as part of
their globalization strategy or to
follow their customers—much 
the same reasons U.S. suppliers
themselves go abroad.
Like many new entrants, the
companies we interviewed often
selected plant sites in the South, 
Mid-South, or Midwest and typically
selected rural or small-town settings
in those regions. Other areas have
been avoided, for the most part. 
The new entrants are absent from 
the Southwest and the West Coast,
with the exception of Toyota’s
operation in San Antonio, Texas, and
the NUMMI operation, an early GM-
Toyota joint venture effort placed in
an existing General Motors factory in
California, closer to Toyota suppliers
in Japan. And the new entrants have
abandoned some areas, such as the
Northeast, in particular, Pennsylvania,
where Volkswagen built a plant that 
is now closed. Hyundai also left
Canada, although Canada has become
a popular site for other new entrants. 
We think this pattern is in part due to
the way automotive manufacturing
operations are structured at this time.
Forty years ago, Chevrolet, a single
division of a single assembler, had
Challenges: What it Takes 
to Enter a New Market
AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPLANTS IN NORTH AMERICA POSE A STRONG
COMPETITIVE THREAT TO DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS AND
SUPPLIERS, BUT THEIR EXPERIENCES OFFER VALUABLE LESSONS
ABOUT THE CHANGING STATE OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPANY SUCCESS TODAY.
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The great effort that both suppliers
and assemblers put into supplier
identification and development
suggests that they want long-term
relationships with their suppliers. 
such high volumes that it often
needed multiple assembly plants for a
particular vehicle. As a consequence,
it made sense to disperse those plants
throughout its market area—that is,
all over the United States. Today, with
total automotive vehicle sales in the
United States spread across a much
greater number of assemblers, very
few automotive makes require more
than a single assembly plant. Thus,
from the point of view of distributing
finished vehicles to all markets fairly
promptly—and to minimize logistics
issues like distance and time for in-
bound supplier parts in a just-in-time
environment—it generally makes
sense to place new assembly plants in
more central locations, rather than on
the East or West Coasts.
The new entrant suppliers and
assemblers we interviewed considered
a number of factors before selecting 
a specific plant construction site.
Aside from customer location, the
most frequently mentioned criterion
was location infrastructure, including
the availability of natural resources,
power, and proximity to major
highways and airports. An adequate
labor supply was the next most
frequently mentioned selection factor.
Case in point, one supplier said his
company experienced difficulties
staffing in the mid-1990s when the
unemployment rate was very low.
Additional location considerations
included the lack of a strong union
presence, plant expansion possibilities,
and state financial assistance,
including workforce training dollars
and tax abatements. 
Incentives
Our respondents voiced some strong
cautions regarding site selection.
First, financial assistance does not last
indefinitely. Training subsidies usually
terminate and tax abatements are
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Most suppliers and assemblers 
started their operations with at least
50 percent of their management team
being expatriates. 
often limited to a certain number of
years. Therefore, an operation must
look beyond temporary financial
incentives and prepare a sufficiently
robust business case to perform
profitably. Second, training subsidies
are not a cure-all for an educated
workforce. As we will discuss in the
Human Resources section, the
locations the new entrants selected 
do exact some penalties, specifically
related to the recruitment and
retention of employees.
Traditional domestic companies 
often point to the advantages of
newer companies and their own
disadvantages, noting that many are
rooted in U.S. public policies and
regulations. But this is oversimplifying
the situation, and may divert
traditional domestic assemblers’
attention from matters they can better
control. New entrant companies
certainly enjoy some competitive
advantages because they are 
younger and growing, but they face
disadvantages, as well. They must
transfer their own company culture 
to a new site; hire and train a
workforce often not used to the
discipline of large-scale manufacturing;
and, as we will see, incorporate North
American suppliers while assisting
their own suppliers in adjusting to a
different business and regulatory
climate here.2
Supplier Parks
It merits mention that the way new
entrants organize their factory site
and plants is increasingly being
adopted by the traditional domestic
assembly plants. Centralized stamping
is yielding to adjacent stamping, and
just-in-time suppliers are increasingly
locating closer to the assembly plant.
However, suppliers have shown
resistance to concentrated adjacent
locations, called supplier parks. 
As one interviewee noted, this may
reflect suppliers’ reluctance to enter
into wage competition with the
assembler or other suppliers.
Fortunately, the U.S. transportation
infrastructure can usually support
supplier locations some distance 
from the often multiple customers 





New entrants are both offshore
relatives of foreign companies and
also North American players. Some
level of autonomy is important if the
plant is to play its role as a part of the
North American industry, implement
appropriate adaptation and change,
and be an effective producer. However,
some level of integration, coordination,
and communication with the offshore
parent company is equally critical for
the plant’s effective operation as part
of the company.
How the home plants of the parent
company view the new entrant—as a
confederate or a competitor—affects
the level of integration a new entrant
has with its headquarters. If the home
plants of the parent company view
the new entrant as a competitor,
headquarters may not provide the
new entrant with the assistance it 
will at times require. To prevent this,
company headquarters must oversee
relationships between the new entrant
and other parts of the firm. One way
a parent company can communicate
the value of transplant operations 
to home-based plants is to reward
managers or executives that relocate
overseas (aka expatriates), in this
case, to North America, by promoting
them when they return to the home
country. For example, Fujio Cho 
was the general manager of Toyota
Manufacturing, U.S.A.’s Georgetown,
Kentucky, plant before returning to
Japan and later becoming president of
Toyota Motor Company. An assembler
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2Flynn, Michael S.; Sims, Maitreya Kathleen; and Alkire, Kara F. “Big 3 remain mostly responsible for own problems.” The Detroit News. 20 April
2003: 13A.
in our study said that his company
valued international experience in all
its employees. In contrast, a supplier
said that an expatriate in his company’s
North American plant may have
difficulty immediately advancing 
once he or she returned to the home
country.
Management Autonomy
We asked to what degree the new
entrants experienced management
autonomy relative to their
headquarters. Generally speaking,
assembler autonomy does not appear
to change much over time. On a scale
from 1 to 5—where 1 indicates
headquarters considers the plant 
to be a quite independent operating
entity and 5 indicates the plant is
regarded as a unit whose decisions
and directions primarily come from
headquarters—the assemblers we
interviewed indicated that they have
had and continue to have moderate 
to full autonomy in the United States.
Most suppliers appear to have
“earned” autonomy over time. That is,
most suppliers rated their startup
autonomy between 3 and 5 and their
autonomy today between 2 and 3. 
Both the assemblers and suppliers
had a difficult time answering this
question because they felt
management had more autonomy 
in particular functional areas than
others. Thus, their ratings probably
reflect an “average” amount of
autonomy over all functional areas.
For example, one supplier had a 
great deal of autonomy in workforce
recruitment and workforce training 
at startup, but little decision-making
responsibility in selecting a general
contractor. Given that this plant’s
headquarters was unfamiliar with
U.S. workforce issues, workforce
recruitment and training autonomy
was appropriate. In the Human
Resources section of this report, 
we will discuss the importance of
assigning the appropriate manager—
local or expatriate—to a particular
functional area.
Interestingly, as time passed, not all
the new entrants acquired more
autonomy. One supplier indicated
that as the home company experienced
international growth, headquarters
exerted more control. This supplier
rated startup autonomy at 1 and rated
the plant’s autonomy today at 3. 
Information Technology Implementation
The companies we interviewed did
confront some IT problems. Some of
the problems were familiar: integrating
incompatible software, catching up to
the U.S. industry in IT implementation,
and trying to get purchasing up to
speed to handle engineering changes. 
ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION IN NORTH AMERICA 11
Yet some difficulties were less
common. In one case, no home-base
ERP solution existed to transfer to
U.S. operations. The company faced
its biggest IT challenges in operations
data quality, specifically in production
control, purchasing, and inventory,
and needed an ERP system to manage
such data. The new entrant was
forced to become the company ERP
pioneer, and the parent company 
later standardized on the plant’s 
ERP solution in North America. 
This example highlights a more
general dilemma: IT implementation
in the North American automotive
industry is progressing more rapidly
than in the Japanese and European
markets. To integrate with the North
American industry, a new entrant
must progress at a rapid, but feasible
rate. Yet if a new entrant’s parent
company integrates IT solutions
slowly because of diluted resources or
an inability to establish an
implementation team, a fast-moving
new entrant risks incompatibility with
and estrangement from the rest of 
the company. At the same time, slow
movement could create problems
with its suppliers and its customers.
This situation may change if more 
of the major European and Japanese
assemblers and suppliers meet the
level of IT implementation of their
leading competitors. Indeed, this may
be occurring now. Toyota, in fact, has
announced that it will be taking
major strides in this direction.
Human Resources: 
Balance Required for 
People Considerations
Management Mix
Figure 2 illustrates the managerial
mix at startup that we found among
the companies we interviewed. The
mix varies considerably, but most
suppliers and assemblers started their
operations with at least 50 percent 
of their management team being
expatriates. Interestingly, suppliers
were more likely to have an
expatriate-dominated mix at startup.
The ratio over time differed among
companies, with most interviewees
indicating that the number of
expatriates should and did decrease
over time. Most of the supplier firms
we  interviewed seem to strive to
increase the proportion of local
managers more so than the
assemblers do. This probably reflects
the greater challenge posed by the
suppliers’ need to staff more plants
and the somewhat scarcer human
resources from home. Valeo, for
example, began its operations with a
2:1 ratio of expatriate to local
managers, but today maintains a 1:5
ratio. An assembler hired an equal
number of expatriate and local
mangers at startup, but while the
ratio today favors local managers, 
the proportion of expatriate to local
managers is still 2:3. 
Management models represent critical
choices, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses. In general, the local
model risks organizing a plant that 
is too independent of the company
12 ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION IN NORTH AMERICA
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culture and approach; however, it
permits local resolution of many
issues, typically by managers better
versed in local conditions, culture,
and circumstances, but less integrated
into the company culture. The
expatriate model inverts these strengths
and weaknesses, demanding remote
resolution of issues by managers not
typically well versed in local
conditions, culture, and circumstances.
The exact strengths and weaknesses
of the mixed model depend on its
degree of mix. Such a model could
offer the strength of balancing the
local plants’ and headquarters’
concerns, but may require time-
consuming negotiation among
managers at the plant and between
the plant and headquarters.
Management Assignments
Japanese and European suppliers 
and assemblers seem to agree that
manager assignments, rather than a
simple numeric ratio, should drive
the mix of managers. For example,
most suppliers and assemblers agree
that local managers should fill human
resource and plant management
positions given their knowledge of
and experience with American
workers, while expatriates are often
better equipped to fill financial and
operating systems, particularly quality,
positions. Across all the companies
we have studied, no functional
assignment has been exclusively filled
by either expatriate or local managers
at startup or soon thereafter.
Of course, there is a potential
downside to assigning local managers
to human resources and purchasing.
If the new entrant wishes to adopt a
different, less traditional relationship
with labor and/or suppliers, the price
for the local managers’ knowledge
and experience might be that it
becomes more difficult to adopt the
new relationship. Indeed, Japanese
respondents in our prior research
commented on the local managers’
background of emphasizing cost 
over quality, surely a handicap for
purchasing positions at the more
quality-driven new entrants.
Comments also were made about the
trouble some local managers had in
understanding and adopting the more
participatory management style of the
new entrants.
An early Japanese new entrant 
from our previous study made an
important general point: The stronger
the operating system of the company,
and the more the parent company
expects it to be replicated here, the
more important it is that key functions
be led by expatriate managers. They
will have the understanding and
experience of the company system 
to be able to inculcate it into the
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American workforce, both to
managers and production workers
(including both direct operators and
indirect maintenance/repair workers).
Other interviewees from the same
company also stressed the importance
of managers understanding the
company philosophy and approach,
and one specifically indicated that
this indeed required that the managers
be expatriates.
The new entrants we studied used 
a range of mechanisms to address
management assignments. One
approach was to assign expatriate
managers as advisers, mentors, or
trainers to local managers. Another
approach was to assign expatriates 
to the locals as coordinators, and 
the final option was actually to have
expatriates function as shadow
managers. It seems that subterfuges
are unlikely to work, but also that
most local managers are willing to
accept supervision and training from
an expatriate colleague. The more
critical issue is to have a plan that
tells the local management cadre how
long the training period will last and
what their promotional opportunities
may be.
Local Management Retention
The U.S. labor market is quite open,
and many executives and managers
believe they should follow a
professional career path across
companies, rather than a company
career across professions. The
company needs to offer clear career
paths for its local managers, especially
insofar as those careers may or may
not realistically involve opportunities
beyond the plant and even North
America. We believe that career
opportunities are an important
motivator for managers, and the
clearer the company makes these
opportunities known, the better the
chance of hiring managers whose
goals appropriately fit the company. 
Ideally, a company should probably
provide both vertical and horizontal
paths, and freedom to move between
plants, at least within North America.
Surprisingly, most of the companies
we interviewed had flexibility like
this built into their management
career paths. A representative from
Valeo said his company offered a
vertical path, several branch paths,
and a formal expert program for
engineers to gain the benefits of
managers and directors while
remaining in their path of expertise.
An assembler described his company’s
career paths as seamless and having
few ceilings. He added that his 
plant’s youth translated into many
opportunities.
Only a couple of companies seemed
to lack clear paths. The interviewees
within these companies even
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“If a supplier fails,
we fail. We cannot 
be successful without
our suppliers.”
disagreed as to the amount of
opportunity built into the company’s
career path, revealing in and of itself
the lack of clarity. 
For many managers, the rewards of
the job are so intertwined with career
advancement that the structure of
those careers must be evident. A new
North American entrant needs to
assess how attractive its employment
opportunities are because the amount
of opportunity will determine the
company’s holding power.
Workforce Recruitment
Like the results we attained from 
our previous study of early Japanese
entrants, the most frequently
mentioned critical challenges for
offshore suppliers and assemblers are
the identification, selection, training,
and retention of a quality workforce.
All suppliers and assemblers we
interviewed partially relied on 
state funding for quality workforce
recruitment and/or training processes.
Much like their Japanese counterparts,
European new entrants place an
enormous emphasis on workforce
selection. 
Generally, state offices helped both
suppliers and assemblers define
workforce hiring criteria, pre-screen
applicants, and deliver aptitude and
dexterity tests. Yazaki, for instance,
received subsidies for partnering with
a local technical school to train
supervisors and toolmakers. Hiring
criteria at plant startup were similar
among suppliers and assemblers, 
as well as across Japanese and
European new entrants. These criteria
included: reading, writing, arithmetic,
communication, and problem-solving
skills; a high school education or
GED; and the ability to work with 
a team. 
Most of the new entrants tended 
to rely on a long selection process,
involving pre-screening, aptitude and
dexterity tests, and even pre-hiring
classroom and simulation training.
Part of this was deliberate: It was 
an effort to test the applicants’
commitment to working for the
company. The assumption was that
people with real commitment would
come back for all the interviews and
tests over a period of time that, for
some early Japanese new entrants,
lasted as long as six months, whereas
those who were less committed
would drop out of the process. This
selection process also gave the new
entrants a chance to evaluate the
applicants in great depth. The lengthy
process must have paid off, as the
most frequently mentioned pleasant
surprise among both early and recent
suppliers and assemblers we
interviewed was their North
American labor forces’ work ethic,
enthusiasm, and high morale.
One hiring criterion that varied
among the early Japanese new
entrants we interviewed was prior
work experience. Some new entrants
specifically sought applicants with 
no industrial experience, while 
others preferred prior industrial or
manufacturing experience. And still
others sought applicants with specific
auto industry experience. Of course,
location often determines the
availability of such workforce
characteristics, but there does not
appear to be a standard experience
preference. 
Our research on early Japanese new
entrants suggests that recruiting
workers familiar with the discipline 
of industrial life reduces the number
of applicants who withdraw from the
recruitment process or workers who
leave the company. Still, some early
new entrants avoided workers with
industrial experience for fear that
such workers retained poor habits
from traditional domestic auto
assembly cultures. If a new entrant 
is looking to establish its own
philosophy, it may find it difficult 
to break the habits of experienced
auto industry workers and may
prefer applicants with other industrial
experience or even no industrial
experience at all. 
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Interviewees in our recent study
experienced a number of hiring
challenges. First, while companies
were able to use state funding to help
select workers, some found they were
only able to hire a small proportion 
of the applicants because many
lacked basic reading, writing, and
arithmetic skills. This lack of an
educated workforce in some areas
required new entrants to design basic
education classes in-house. Securing 
a sufficiently educated workforce is a
daunting recruitment challenge for
any assembler or supplier; however,
given suppliers’ lower wages and
benefits, the challenge is probably
more daunting.
Second, recruiting and retaining
technicians also proved difficult for
one company that located midway
between two major cities. The location
is too long a commute to attract and
keep talented technicians, especially
since it is not sufficiently far away to
convince people to relocate. Another
company experienced difficulty
recruiting and retaining management
at startup because the plant location’s
struggling education system made
relocation unattractive.
Third, attaining accurate labor and
development cost estimates can be
difficult when those estimates are
provided by local officials motivated
to attract new business. One supplier
received artificially low cost estimates
in a tight labor market. The interviewee
said the data should have been
presented more specifically to reflect
more realistic estimates. The distorted
estimates would make financial
planning for the plant difficult. 
Workforce Training
All of the suppliers and assemblers
we interviewed used on-the-job
training with workers. On-the-job
training was accomplished through
some combination of sending team
members to their home plants
overseas, to their company’s other
U.S. plants, or established partnerships
with local technical schools to
facilitate training. Mercedes, for
example, sent some of its first hired
employees to Germany for six months.
When the trainees returned, they
trained new hires on-site. Also,
Honda sent workers from Alliston,
Ontario, to train and assist its startup
in Lincoln, Nebraska. Yazaki used
another North American plant to
instruct new workers, as well as a
local technical school to instruct
toolmakers. Both suppliers and
assemblers supplemented on-the-
job training with some classroom
education. This training usually
included a standard company
introduction, as well as computer
and procedure training. In total, 
the recent supplier new entrants 
we interviewed trained their initial
workforce between 80 and 160 hours,
while assemblers trained their initial
workforce considerably longer— 
in some cases, up to six months. 
Value Chain: Strong Supply
Chain Stability at Startup
Supplier Selection
Assemblers identified a number 
of attributes they look for during
supplier selection: management
process, training process, technical
competence, quality, financial
viability, and delivery price. While
the assemblers said cost was a
selection factor, we sensed that they
generally weighted effective processes
more heavily. 
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We asked interviewees to identify
success factors for new entrant
suppliers from their home countries.
The most frequently mentioned
success factors were providing
customers with a differentiating
technology, replicating the factors 
that made the supplier successful in
its home country, and understanding
the U.S. business culture.
Supplier Relations
Toyota and Honda have long had a
reputation for close and supportive
interaction with their suppliers.
Mercedes now also has a reputation
for close supplier interaction in the
United States. While many new
entrants initially sourced parts and
components from suppliers inherited
from headquarters, Mercedes sought
many new suppliers for the new
product they intended to introduce 
to the U.S. market. The company
developed new U.S. suppliers by 
fully integrating them into its daily
business processes, including sending
Mercedes engineer support teams to
work at supplier plants. Mercedes felt
supplier support was critical in order
for the company to implement its
modular construction assembly
approach. 
Surprisingly, the new entrant suppliers
we interviewed also implemented a
number of development processes
with their suppliers, including regular
evaluations of quality and production
control, certification processes,
workshops, and organizing teams 
to work with suppliers experiencing
difficulties. One supplier is specifically
helping its suppliers implement a
web-based EDI system and Toyota’s
lean manufacturing approach. 
In part, supplier development
processes appear to depend on the
product bought from the supplier.
For example, one supplier said that
working with raw materials suppliers
was rarely problematic and that there
was very little turnover in this segment.
Parts and components suppliers, 
on the other hand, experienced
higher turnover and needed more
development attention from the
customer, including determining best
transportation routes and in-house
assistance with production and
quality tasks. 
With the exception of one supplier,
most of our respondents experienced
high supply chain stability at startup.
In fact, Mercedes experienced no
turnover at startup, despite selecting
almost all new suppliers. Some actions
that new entrants took to maintain
low supplier turnover included
inventory buffering, providing the
supplier early engineering support,
and implementing just-in-time 
and just-in-sequence production. 
A Mercedes interviewee suggested
that his company’s high stability may
be related to its fact-based selection
process. Specifically, this company
visited potential suppliers and
evaluated them on technical
competency, hiring and training
process, and financial viability. 
The great effort that both suppliers
and assemblers put into supplier
identification and development
suggests that they want long-term
relationships with their suppliers.
Nonetheless, we detected a
willingness to terminate relationships,
especially when a company deems
that a supplier has performed poorly
or been unable to keep abreast 
of changes in manufacturing
technology and practice. A recent
Automotive News report suggests that
DaimlerChrysler may be thinning the
ranks of its suppliers at its M-Class
plant in Alabama, as it automates its
operations more fully and attempts to
gain yet more control over the quality
of its SUV production.3
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3Kochan, Anna. “Mercedes cuts role of suppliers in Alabama.” Automotive News. 30 June 2003. 
We asked some suppliers and
assemblers where they would place
their plant’s expectations on a scale
from 1 to 5, where 1 means their
company expects a customer-supplier
partnership and 5 means their
company expects an arm’s-length
relationship. New entrant suppliers
and assemblers expected a customer-
supplier partnership. Suppliers
agreed, though, that a partnership
was a mere expectation—the actual
relationship varied with the customer. 
All of our supplier respondents
described their traditional U.S.
domestic customers as maintaining 
a more arm’s-length relationship
(scores ranging between 3 and 4.5),
and described their offshore-based
customers as maintaining a full or
nearly full partnership (scores ranging
between 1 and 1.5). As Figure 3
depicts, these findings are consistent
with the 2003 results of a customer-
supplier relationship survey that
found suppliers prefer Japanese
customers on 17 measures ranging
from trust to perceived opportunity 
to making acceptable profits.
Furthermore, the survey results
indicated that suppliers’ preference
for Toyota, Honda, and Nissan had
risen since last year, while their
preference for two of the traditional
domestics—Ford and GM—had fallen. 
As business at new entrant assemblers
has grown, companies like Honda
and Mercedes have attracted more
American suppliers. The suppliers
that have captured business with the
new assemblers have shifted their
focus and begun to consider
alternative ways of doing business.
Some suppliers, but not all, have
themselves become advocates of a
developmental model of sourcing,
and a few of these have even
extended the concept to their own
transactions with their supply base.
These suppliers have often profited
by their association with one or more
new entrant customers, and have
developed strengths in areas such as
quality and productivity that were
areas of weakness in the past.
Supply Chain Management 
We asked assemblers and suppliers
what supply chain management
challenges they faced and lessons 
they learned as new U.S. entrants.
They mentioned a number of costly
problems.
The most frequently mentioned
challenge was the steep shipping 
and logistics costs that accompanied
offshore suppliers. One new entrant
supplier said that if a legacy supplier
is unable to support a customer’s
remote operations, the customer
should encourage the supplier to
build local support or change
suppliers and revalidate before
production. The supplier added that
the more quickly a company localizes
suppliers, the more successfully that
company’s supply chain will operate.
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To reconcile shipping costs, some
new entrant suppliers needed to
buffer inventory. 
Two suppliers cautioned against
giving a large proportion of business
to one new supplier. An assembler
agreed, adding that it was very easy
to rely too heavily on new entrant
suppliers that also face the challenges
and problems of startup and scarce
resources. Specifically, one supplier
suggested only giving 25 percent 
to 30 percent of business to a new
supplier. Another suggested hiring 
a minimum of two new suppliers 
for each component. Third, some
new entrants warned that modifying
specifications for U.S. suppliers and
locating necessary materials in the
United States can pose a challenge. In
one instance, a specification problem
was solved only after developing
expensive proprietary tooling. 
Traditional domestic assemblers 
and suppliers planning to set up
operations overseas would be
especially wise to learn from the
shipping and logistics experiences
described by our interviewees. The
additional cost of buffering for North
American Tier N suppliers (that is,
lower-tier or indirect suppliers) may
lead assemblers and suppliers that are
globalizing to source from their new
plant locations in places like China.
But these assemblers and suppliers
should also be forewarned that while
production and labor costs may be
cheaper in China, the additional costs
of hiring and developing more than
one new supplier for each component
may outweigh the costs of
maintaining relations with their
North American legacy suppliers.
Legacy suppliers may be able to avoid
a supplier switch by ensuring
accurate delivery timing and safe
shipping processes, and perhaps by
opening operations in China.
Companies relied on assistance from
North American headquarters, home
country headquarters, consultants,
and the suppliers themselves to
resolve their challenges. Given the
complexity of the supply chain, it is
not surprising that every company we
interviewed experienced some supply
chain management issue. The variety
of issues leads us to believe that
supply chain problems are difficult 
to predict; however, as globalization
increases, companies new to global
operations should take note of such
difficulties to try as best they can 
to find a solution to the problems 
as early as possible. 
New and Inherited Customers
Our earlier work with four Japanese
assemblers reviewed some of the
tensions that can develop when a new
entrant supplier “follows” a customer
here, but then needs to expand its
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“You try to limit your
variables at startup. We
used established processes,
established equipment, and
an established supply chain. 
The only variable was the
largely U.S. labor supply.”
volumes by adding other customers,
or when suppliers enter new markets
with existing facilities and inherited
customers. One of the plants we
interviewed in this project was
originally owned by an American
company. When the new entrant
bought that company, the new owner
was able to continue supplying the
company’s prior customers. Years
later, this plant also inherited 
a relationship with a European
customer—a relationship that was
originally formulated in Europe. The
supplier also added customers that
were already purchasing components
from its other U.S. plants. We think
this timeline is relatively typical:
Successful new entrant suppliers 
are established only after a sufficient
number of likely customers are well
in view. 
The suppliers we interviewed offered
several cautions about acquiring new
accounts. First, seek growing
companies (this includes several of
the new entrant assemblers). Second,
seek companies with a reputation for
sustaining positive supplier relations.
Third, diversify across customers.
The second and third points have
becoming more feasible as the North
American landscape includes more
and more assemblers that, to some
extent, must compete for high quality
suppliers. For example, reports
suggest a domestic tire manufacturer
with a successful aftermarket business
declined a potential customer’s
contract based on the customer’s
supplier relationships. The tire
manufacturer believed its business
volumes were sufficient without
adding a customer known for weaker
supplier relationships.
Competitive Pressures
The emphasis on cost reduction
varied considerably among the
companies we studied. For one
supplier, the multi-year contracts 
the company signs with its customers
are based on flat prices, with the
exception of fluctuating raw material
costs. To attain a profit, therefore, 
the supplier generates cost reduction
programs to increase labor efficiency
and reduce scrap. Yazaki did not
make cost reduction a priority during
the first 18 months of operation.
Instead, the supplier focused on its
product quality and delivery. An
assembler reduced cost by excluding
automation in some areas of the plant
to keep depreciation cost down. 
The plant also searched worldwide
for underutilized equipment in its
company’s other plants to use on its
own line. 
We asked our interviewees how they
implemented cost reduction programs
without damaging customer-supplier
relations. The answers varied and
included setting targets for suppliers
and sharing cost savings. One
assembler explicitly indicated that
cost reduction efforts vis-a-vis its own
suppliers were not initially important.
The assembler’s startup goal was to
maintain product quality. 
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Manufacturing: Begin With a
Proven Product and Process
New vs. Old 
Our past research suggests that new
entrants perform best in terms of
operational efficiency when their
process and first products are those
that have already been successfully
produced up to mid-cycle at the
company’s other plants. Most of the
companies we interviewed began
operations with a proven product 
and process, except one supplier 
that began its operations with a new
process and one assembler that began
with a new modular process and 
a new product. These companies
seemed to agree that beginning
operations with a proven product and
process relieved some startup stress. 
Some early Japanese entrants did not
substantially change or alter their
company’s traditional ways of
organizing and operating production
processes, although there was
discussion of incremental improvement
and the need to innovate (as is true
among our newer entrants), but they
clearly did not believe there was 
any fundamental change required 
to adapt to the American production
environment. One interviewee
characterized Honda’s Lincoln plant
as a footprint of its sister plant 
in Ontario, aside from including
incremental improvements like the
latest technology in stamping and
welding, and building engine
assembly in the plant. On the other
hand, Nissan Smyrna relied on higher
levels of automation than is typical 
in its plants in Japan. And Diamond
Star was itself a curious hybrid of
Mitsubishi process equipment and
Chrysler operating methods and
procedures. 
Schedule Stability
Schedule stability did not pose the
challenge we thought it might. 
Our respondents indicated that
production was rather stable at startup.
This is partly due to the fact that
these firms were building inventory
initially, but a growing demand for
many of these products soon followed.
In fact, most assemblers and suppliers
we studied needed to expand their
production facilities within a few
years after startup. But these tended
to be steady ramp-ups, not the wide
fluctuations in demand that really
constitute schedule instability.
Occasionally a supplier or assembler
experienced disruptions. For example,
during the Gulf War, the cyclical
nature of the American market led to
short-term, but steep, order declines
for the suppliers. 
Time to Full Operation
Most of our respondents spent a year
or less ramping up to full operation,
defined in terms of rated jobs 
per hour operating on one shift. 
One supplier even had a line fully
operating successfully within three
weeks of its plant opening for
production. Given the supplier’s
phased startup plan, however, it took
more time before all the production
lines were operating. 
The new entrants’ rapid production
ramp-up was often preceded by rapid
factory construction. We were
impressed by how quickly one
assembler completed the first phase
of its factory and how rapidly it
finished a major expansion of its
factory. We stress this because new
entrant nimbleness represents another
competitive challenge to traditional
domestic companies, both assembler
and supplier. 
Information Technology
IT implementation timing appears to
have been another challenge among
new entrants. One interviewee
cautioned against simultaneously
implementing ERP and production at
startup. In hindsight, the interviewee
believed the company should have
developed its ERP system further
before plant startup. The growth of
the company’s production facilities
led to a strained IT infrastructure.
The software in use, however,
performed as expected.
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There are numerous challenges facing
new entrants in the North American
automotive assembly and supplier
industry. Many of these are particular
to a given company, site, and product,
but many of them are more general
and therefore likely to apply to a
greater or lesser degree to virtually
any company, site, or product.
Indeed, some lessons learned by
foreign-based entrants into North
America almost certainly have
important implications and useful
suggestions for traditional domestic
assemblers and suppliers as they
themselves go abroad to establish
their own new entrant operations.
Moreover, some of these lessons 
even apply to traditional domestic
companies’ own activities in the
North American industry. This
section provides our estimation of
some of the key lessons revealed by
our research, and our best judgment
as to where they may apply.
Implications for New Entrants
A major balance challenge for new
entrants develops in the plant’s initial
staffing decisions, where the ratio and
exact assignments of expatriate and
local managers play a key role in
setting the parameters for the new
entrant’s culture and role in the North
American industry and in its home
company. There is no question that it
is difficult to balance out managerial
skills and assets across local
knowledge, company experience,
and task competence. Our report
suggests that companies indeed vary
widely in how they address this
challenge, but that successful
operations have developed stronger
local management teams over time.
A second major challenge comes to 
the fore as the new entrant tries to
balance the participation and career
opportunities for its expatriate and
local U.S. managers, both locally 
and globally. If local managers see
themselves as restricted to local
opportunities they may leave for
better career opportunities. On the
other hand, as the experiences of 
U.S. companies attest, it can be quite
difficult to manage successfully a
truly international management cadre. 
New entrant assemblers and suppliers
also face a major challenge in
balancing the organizational
independence necessary to participate
in the North American industry with
the organizational integration they
Conclusion: Implications and
Recommendations for the Industry
THE NEW ENTRANTS REMIND THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY
THAT IT CAN BE MORE PROACTIVE IN SHAPING ITS SUCCESS
AND LESS REACTIVE TO SOME INEVITABLE OUTCOME.
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The workforce can change its
skills and attitudes, and the best
tools for accomplishing this are
training and changes in managerial
and company cultures. 
must have to participate as a good
citizen in the home company.
Achieving this balance is difficult and
there is no one solution that works
well in all instances. This is especially
the case since this tension between
independence and integration is
reflected in numerous decisions—
decisions that must themselves 
often alter and change with shifting
circumstances. This challenge is
especially difficult in IT, where new
entrants must meet North American
industry expectations that are often
higher than the home industry
requirements.
A fourth major balance challenge
comes as the new entrant suppliers
typically find they must develop
additional customers in order to meet
their own business objectives. These
new customers can upset the delicate
balance and chemistry of supplier/
customer relationships, and the
business decisions that are viewed as
necessary in either the home or North
American industry context can turn
out to be problematic in the other.
The fifth major balance challenge
comes as the new entrants, both
assemblers and suppliers, develop
and manage their own supply chains.
They must manage some suppliers
from the company’s traditional home
base supply chain; others that are
themselves new entrants, perhaps
drawn to North America because of
the company’s demands that they do
so; and still others that are traditional,
in-place North American suppliers.
This is a complex challenge and 
often requires extensive sourcing 
and re-sourcing. Again, there are
business and political considerations
and constraints to these decisions 
that may differ between the North
American and home operations. 
How the new entrant resolves these
tensions will in large part shape its
twin roles as a member of the North
American industry and a unit of its
company. 
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Some of the challenges that
new entrants face are the same
ones traditional companies face
as they reorganize, expand, or
change product or locations.
Implications for Traditional U.S.
Companies Going Abroad
The U.S. industry is making major
investments abroad, especially in
China. China differs enormously 
from the United States in terms of 
its business, political, and economic
climate, and the specific challenges 
of adjusting successfully to China 
will likely be very different.
However, the five general challenges
discussed above are likely to be
present for North American companies
going abroad, whether to China or
elsewhere. And if companies view
China as more difficult to enter than
North America, we would expect
these challenges to be only more
severe. Company management must
see the resolution of these challenges
and their associated tensions as a
major part of the challenge of going
abroad, and pay appropriate attention
to them. Reflecting on the experiences
of foreign-based companies coming
here may well suggest issues and
possible responses that can be useful
to U.S. companies going abroad.
Implications for Traditional U.S.
Companies in North America
Just as we think the lessons learned
by new entrants into the North
American industry can help U.S.
companies as they go abroad, we
think that they can also be useful 
to established, traditional domestic
assemblers and suppliers. It is 
worth remembering that some of the
challenges that new entrants face are
the same ones traditional companies
face as they reorganize, expand, or
change product or locations.
Most of the new entrant lessons with
implications for established North
American industry participants
involve some reconsideration of 
the conventional wisdom about the
inevitability of the obstacles facing
the industry. In a sense, conventional
wisdom calls attention primarily to
the legacy competitive disadvantages
of the established players, including 
a more unionized (and therefore
presumably more recalcitrant)
workforce; older workforces,
brownfield plants, and equipment; a
high ratio of retirees to actives and its
associated costs; and so forth. To be
sure, these are real challenges, and
some are even almost as bad as the
conventional wisdom portrays them.
At the same time, automotive
customers are uninterested in these
challenges and demand that auto
companies meet the competition
using whatever changes are necessary.
Conventional wisdom also identifies
the competitive advantages of the
new entrants, ranging from a less
unionized (and therefore presumably
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Established domestic companies
face real challenges, but
unfortunately automotive
customers are for the most part
uninterested in legacy challenges.
more cooperative) workforce;
younger workforces, greenfield plants
and equipment that reflect the latest
knowledge and technology; few
retirees; heavy incentives from state
and local governments; and so forth.
Again, most of these advantages are
real, and some are even almost as
good as conventional wisdom asserts.
Yet they ignore the fact that these
plants operate in the same country,
with the same laws and regulations,
and use domestic North American
labor in achieving their success.
We firmly believe that conventional
wisdom errs not so much in the
details, but in the degree to which
they are described as fixed and
immutable. And that is why we think
that the lessons from the new entrants
remind the traditional industry that it
can be more proactive in shaping its
success and less reactive to some
inevitable outcome.
Perhaps the major lesson that the
traditional industry should learn from
the experiences of these new entrants
is that the North American workforce
can generate world-class results, and
the best tools for accomplishing this
are effective recruitment, training, and
changes in managerial and company
cultures. If the problems of the
traditional workforce are rooted in
the current structure and
arrangements of the workplace, and if
the new entrants have in general
offered quite different workplaces 
and gained quite different workforces,
surely it makes sense to change the
workplace, rather than simply accepting
the legacy workforce as a given.
Another important lesson is that
incentives, no matter how lucrative,
are temporary, and the new entrants
had to develop and pursue business
plans that did not rely on incentives.
Whatever the value of the incentives
granted to new entrants (and
traditional companies similarly
investing), many new entrants have
already exhausted them. Traditional
companies have survived them, and
that part of the playing field is now
rapidly leveling.
In addition, we have discovered that
proximity might not be the unmixed
blessing that many once thought it to
be, and that the handicaps of distance
are also less than many expected. 
So the more dispersed state of the
traditional North American industry
may not be a severe handicap, as the
transportation infrastructure and
improved logistics have served the
industry well. At the same time, 
the relative concentration of new
entrant plants has conferred some
disadvantages as well as advantages,
often straining the labor supply.
Finally, the traditional domestic
industry faces far smaller challenges
in two important arenas. For one, the
traditional industry has much less
concern for balancing expatriate and
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local managers, and tensions between
plants and headquarters, while often
real, are not complicated to the same
degree by language, time, and culture
differences. For another, while
conventional wisdom sees “newness”
as an unmitigated blessing, it clearly
raises numerous challenges, as
discussed above, and most older,
traditional operations have in large
measure resolved these challenges.
Endnote: Lessons Learned
The challenges and responses of new
entrants and established participants
will often differ, but perhaps not to 
as large a degree as many expect.
This should not be too surprising
when one considers that both are
participating in the same industry
and the same national political,
economic, and business regime. And
to the extent that they face similar
challenges with a similar response
repertoire, the lessons learned by one
should provide useful information for
the other. 
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Exchange Rates: Shaping the
Competitive Threat
The U.S. industry tends to see
important advantages for offshore
automotive producers in currency
exchange rates, typically feeling 
that the dollar is too strong, or the
euro/yen too weak, making U.S.
production less cost competitive 
with imports. However, shifts in the
currency exchange rates probably
matter less in terms of establishing a
company’s level of competitiveness
than they do in shaping the kind of
competitive threat a company faces. 
Setting aside the complex issue of
whether a particular currency may 
be over- or under-valued, recent 
shifts in the currency exchange rate
for the euro and yen may indeed
change the basis of competition with
offshore producers. The dollar has
weakened over the past year, making
exports from euro and yen producers
substantially more expensive in dollars
than they were a year ago. At the
same time, the weakening dollar/
strengthening euro and yen mean that
dollar investments in the United
States have become less expensive for
yen- and euro-based producers. 
If the current shift continues, we
would expect to see a fall in exports
to the United States, but also an
increase in U.S. investments, as
offshore producers expand their 
U.S. participation as new entrants.
Exchange rates are indeed important
not only in the comparative costs
between international competitors,
but are also major determinants of
whether exporting or foreign direct
investment (FDI) is the better strategy
for a given competitor. As Figure 4
illustrates, changes in currency
exchange rates drive export and
investment costs in opposite directions.
Production: Domestic Suppliers
and Assemblers Under Pressure
Today, new entrant assemblers’
production capacity in North America
exceeds 4 million vehicles. These
additions have not been solely
incremental capacity though, as many
assemblers have shifted production
from other locations to North America.
Indeed, as Figure 5 illustrates, the
four major Japanese assemblers in
North America are now sourcing
substantial proportions of their 
total vehicle sales from their local
U.S. plants.
Appendix: An Historical View of
Production, Sales, and Profit Trends
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NEW ENTRANTS HAVE EXPERIENCED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS
IN THE NORTH AMERICAN MARKET OVER THE PAST THREE
DECADES. THE FOLLOWING PAGES PROVIDE A DETAILED LOOK
AT THIS DEVELOPMENT, WITH A FOCUS ON HISTORICAL
INDUSTRY TRENDS.
This shift in vehicle production has
presented an important threat to
traditional suppliers, since much 
of the new entrants’ incremental
production gain comes at the expense
of the suppliers’ traditional domestic
customers—Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors. As their customers
lose business, so do suppliers.
Nevertheless, as Figure 6 illustrates,
as these new entrant assemblers have
steadily increased their local build,
they have also increased their local
buy, and traditional suppliers can
pursue business with them. Still, for
traditional suppliers, new entrant
business all too often constitutes 
a shift in customers rather than
incremental sales, and thus at best
replaces the lost business. 
As recently as 1992, traditional North
American suppliers dominated the
North American supplier industry,
accounting for over 80 percent of the
top 50 suppliers based on North
American sales. As Figure 7 indicates,
however, the composition of this elite
group has changed through mergers,
acquisitions, and investments, such
that traditional suppliers now account
for 60 percent of North American
sales. As Figure 8 reveals, the
traditional domestic suppliers in the
top 50 performed well in terms of
sales, capturing over 90 percent of
North American sales in 1992, but
then fell to 75 percent by 2002.
Similarly, as Figure 9 indicates, 
in 1992 the traditional domestic
suppliers captured over 70 percent 
of worldwide sales by the North
American top 50 suppliers, falling to
54 percent by 2002. European-based,
North American suppliers gained the
most share of worldwide sales over
those 10 years, moving from 12 percent
of the total to 29 percent.
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Source: The Economist, December 2003 compared to December 2002
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Source: Automotive News
Figure 7. Composition of top 50 suppliers based 










Figure 8. North American suppliers’ share of 







































































Source: Automotive News Market Data Book
Figure 5. Percent of U.S. sales assembled here.
Source: Automotive News, October 2000; JAMA, October 2002, November 2003

















As Figure 10 illustrates, the
traditional domestic assemblers’
passenger car volumes have declined
precipitously. This, despite the near-
record sales levels of the past few
years. This decline is partly due to a
shift in demand from passenger cars
to light trucks, including pickups,
minivans, and SUVs; however, the
decline is also partly due to the
traditional domestic assemblers’
market share loss. In fact, as Figure 11
reveals, when we eliminate the effects
of market fluctuations and vehicle
segment shifts and examine production
share, we see the traditional
domestics have lost 40 points of
North American car production
share. Indeed, Honda and Toyota
alone now account for 20 percent of
North American car production.
Although sales of light trucks and
passenger cars are still relatively
balanced given that more passenger
cars than light trucks are imported,
the traditional domestics’ passenger
car production has fallen, while light
truck production has increased to
meet shifting demand. In fact, as
Figure 12 indicates, light truck
production in North America now
exceeds passenger car production. 
As Figure 13 reveals, the two major
Japanese producers in North America
have accelerated their light truck
production more rapidly than
passenger car production over the
past five years. This acceleration 
has also contributed to the overall
increase in light truck production
share. It also merits mention that this
light truck production acceleration
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Source: Automotive News Market Data Book


















































Source: Automotive News Market Data Book
























































Source: Automotive News Market Data Book
Figure 12. Traditional domestic car and light truck

















































Source: Automotive News Market Data Book
Figure 13. Honda’s and Toyota’s passenger car and light

















































offers an opportunity to traditional
parts suppliers that may have focused
their business more on the light truck
build of their customers than the
passenger car build.
Figure 14 suggests another major
change for the traditional industry
over the past 25 years: The proportion
of vehicles assembled in the United
States that are assembled by UAW-
represented workers has declined
some 19 percentage points since
1978, falling from 100 to 81 percent.
This not only affects the UAW’s
bargaining power, but makes them 
a competitive factor. Not only does
the industry now have union and
nonunion assemblers, but companies
that can effectively build on their
relationship with the UAW, much as
those that can effectively deploy their
supplier relationships, may develop




Using the then-record sales and
production year of 1978 as a base
year, Figure 15 illustrates that the
traditional domestics have lost a
combined 22 points of market share.
Moreover, Ford and Chrysler show
little change, losing and gaining 
three points respectively over that
period, while GM has lost 22 points.
Meanwhile, Honda has more than
doubled its share and Toyota has
almost tripled its share. The remaining
new entrant and import assemblers
have captured 10 percent of the
market since 1978. 
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Source: Automotive News Market Data Book
Figure 14. Proportion of vehicles assembled in the United States that are





















































When we examine the sales patterns
of the individual traditional domestic
assemblers in Figure 16, a number of
important patterns emerge. First, in
the late 1960s and early 1970s when
GM dominated the U.S. market, the
proportion of Ford sales that were
light truck sales already exceeded 
the overall market share for these
vehicles. On the other hand, Chrysler
sold proportionately fewer trucks
than the market demanded. So Ford
was already a stronger performer in
light trucks than in passenger cars,
and Chrysler stronger in passenger
cars than light trucks. Meanwhile,

































































*1999–2003: Includes foreign subsidiaries of Big Three
Source: Automotive News, January 6, 2003; Automotive News Market Data Book
Figure 15. Big Five total vehicle market share in the United States.
*Data before 1995 include Canada.
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book.












Source: Automotive News, January 6, 2003
Figure 17. U.S. market share in 2003, by company and vehicle type.
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GM sales were balanced, equally
strong in both markets, and able 
to move with, or even drive, the
market shifts between light trucks
and passenger cars.
Second, the introduction of the
minivan in the mid-1980s and
Chrysler’s subsequent acquisition 
of American Motors made Chrysler
more of a light truck producer,
although this has been slightly
modified since Daimler acquired the
company in 1997. 
Third, GM moved off the market
mean and began to rely more on 
light truck sales in 2000, leaving all
of the traditional domestics stronger
performers, but also more reliant on
light truck sales. Moreover, GM’s
improved performance in light 
trucks relative to passenger cars
reflects both a strengthening light
truck performance and a weakening
passenger car performance. 
Fourth, the Japanese producers have
alternated between meeting the
market mix of vehicles and performing
more strongly in the passenger car
segment of the market. Since 1995,
the Japanese assemblers’ performance
has been moving to the market mean,
strengthening in light trucks, even
while continuing to strengthen in
passenger cars.
Today, light trucks account for about
52 percent of the total U.S. market,
so we essentially find two distinct 













1.00 As a “buy” shifts from passenger car to light truck,

























one for passenger cars and one for
light trucks. If we examine the
performance of the Big Five and a 
few illustrative competitors in the
light truck and passenger car
markets, Figure 17 reveals the
striking extent to which performance
in the two vehicle markets can
diverge. Chrysler, for example, has
just about twice the market share in
light trucks that it has in passenger
cars. Toyota and GM have the most
balanced performance; although 
GM’s segment performance trend is
diverging, while Toyota’s segment
performance is converging.
Perhaps the easiest way to visualize
the market implications of assemblers’
differential performance in the two
vehicle segments is to consider a
customer shopping for a vehicle. 
As Figure 18 illustrates, if a customer
decides to buy a passenger car, the
odds of the traditional domestics
capturing the sale are less than 50/50
and falling. On the other hand, if the
customer elects to buy a light truck,
the odds of the traditional domestics
capturing the sale are nearly 75/25,
but also falling.
So, the traditional domestics perform
best in the market’s current growth
segment. Differential performance in
passenger cars and light trucks may
be a fact of life in the industry, since
most companies probably cannot
afford the huge product investments
required to be top competitors in
both. But we noted earlier that both
Toyota and Honda are moving to
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balance their performance as they
increase their light truck share more
rapidly than their passenger car share. 
Moreover, the market could shift
back to passenger cars if style
preferences or utility needs change,
fuel availability decreases, fuel prices
continue to increase, or other
environmental concerns increase. It is
difficult to predict the effect of
environmental events and purchasing
factors on sales. The overwhelming
majority of experts missed the fuel
shocks of the 1970s, and many
customers report the importance of
environmental factors in their
purchase decision, while making
purchases that seem inconsistent with
those views.
Nonetheless, the U.S. auto industry
now finds itself lagging the 
Japanese industry in hybrid vehicle
development, and risking exposure 
to a massive market swing like that
which accompanied the oil shocks of
the 1970s and left the traditional
domestics unable to provide
consumers with the fuel-efficient 
cars offered by Japanese competitors.
Certainly a major oil shock, sustained
oil price increases, air quality
concerns, and concerns about foreign
oil dependence could develop and
might well lead U.S. consumers back
to passenger cars over time. If such a
shift occurs, then Chrysler, Ford, and
GM stand to lose many sales and, if
customers shift to hybrids, perhaps
face a disaster of 1970s proportions
for them and their suppliers.
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Source: Automotive News, August 11, 2003
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Source: Automotive News online November 7, 2003 for October; February 5, 2004 for January
Figure 20. Incentive spending by company.
Dollars






Source: Automotive News, August 2003
Figure 21. Rebates and subsidized financing in August 2003, by company.








Profit: Incentives Subsidize Sales
In spite of the traditional domestics’
impressive efforts to close the
competitive advantage held by some
offshore producers, they continue 
to heavily subsidize sales through 
the use of incentives. As Figure 19
reveals, the level of traditional
domestics’ incentives in 1995 was
somewhat below $1,500 per vehicle.
In 2003, their incentives were
approaching $4,000. And, as Figure 20
reveals, the traditional domestics’
incentive spending per vehicle is
considerably above that of their major
Japanese rivals. Moreover, as Figure 21
illustrates, the traditional domestics’
incentives are more widespread across
their product lines, in contrast to those






































































Source: Harbour, Automotive News, June 17, 2002
Figure 23. Profit per vehicle, by year.















Figure 24. Share of total fleet passenger car market, by
assembler.













Figure 25. Share of total fleet SUV market, by assembler.




























Industry profits have suffered, and
incentives only add to the challenge
of earning sufficient revenues to
support the huge product investments
required to be a full line assembler.
As Figure 22 reveals, each profit
peak, even in current dollars is lower
than the previous one, and the
industry simply does not earn the
returns it once did, even in the
difficult 1970s. As Figure 23
indicates, this has led to a poor 
profit performance at the traditional
domestics, especially compared with
Honda and Toyota. 
Fleet sales constitute another
comparative weakness for some of the
traditional domestics’ profits. Ford
and GM rely on more or less “captive”
sales, including their own employees,
relatives, vendors, and fleets, all of
which tend to be associated with
deep discounts that restrict profit.
Ford and GM only captured about 
40 percent of the passenger car market
in 2003, but as Figure 24 reveals,
accounted for about 63 percent of
passenger car fleet sales. 
Figure 25 illustrates the share of the
total fleet SUV market by assembler.
New entrants have a higher
participation in fleet sales for SUVs
than for pickup trucks, where their
share is less than 5 percent. This
might reflect fleet purchasing
decisions based on quality ratings or
residual values, but could reflect an
advertising tactic for these assemblers
to make the public more aware of their
relatively newer SUV product line.
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